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Introduction
The Hon. Justice Marc Rosenberg

When Parliament decided to include a charter of rights in the newly
repatriated Constitution, few people associated with the criminal justice
system expected a dramatic change in the practice and administration of
the criminal law. There were many signs that the judiciary and, indeed, the
public would be reluctant to embrace a significant expansion of individual
rights, especially rights for accused persons. There was the example of
the Supreme Court’s appalling treatment of the Canadian Bill of Rights.1
And, there was the perception that a robust interpretation of the American
Bill of Rights had led to increasing crime and general lawlessness in the
United States, with few, if any, advances in security and rights protection
for the law-abiding.
As the essays in this remarkable volume amply demonstrate, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 has indeed had a profound
effect on the fabric of the law and especially on the development and
application of the criminal law. Even when the Charter is not directly
engaged, Charter values have infused the interpretation and application of
the criminal law. Twenty-five years after proclamation of the Charter much
has changed in the practice of the criminal law. The Charter experience is
entirely different from the experience under the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Granting constitutional protection to individual rights and especially legal
rights has made a significant difference in the everyday work of law
enforcement and of the prosecution and defence of criminal cases.
Of course, once the Supreme Court of Canada demonstrated that it
was willing to engage in a robust interpretation of the Charter in cases such
as Therens3, Oakes4 and Collins,5 in short, to take the Charter seriously,
the Court raised expectations amongst many in the criminal justice system.
Not surprisingly, after the initial burst of enthusiasm there followed a period
1

R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
3
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
4
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
5
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
2
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of consolidation and in some cases retrenchment that has disappointed
some but to be fair also reassured others. For example, in search and
seizure the approach favouring protection of privacy interests through a
presumption requiring judicial pre-authorization for a valid search as
enunciated in Hunter v. Southam Inc.6 gave way in Edwards,7 to one
more aligned with traditional concepts of property and to a narrowing of
categories attracting the warrant requirement in Tessling.8
As well, while the Supreme Court has adopted a principled approach
in many areas of criminal law, an approach that has particularly helped
direct the development of the law of evidence, the principled approach
has not always guided the work of the Court as it sought to apply the
Charter to the criminal law. The exclusion of evidence under section 24(2)
provides one example. While the Court in Stillman9 developed a principled
approach to the trial fairness component of the Collins test for exclusion
of evidence, a coherent test for what Professor Stuart and others would
consider the most important element of the test, the measure of the
seriousness of the violation, has eluded the Court.
And, even where the Court has attempted to enunciate a principled
approach, that approach is rarely greeted with universal acclaim. The
Court’s approach to cruel and unusual punishment, for example, continues
to disappoint, and substantive due process has proved a difficult concept
to implement in a coherent and principled manner because subjective
factors like fault, stigma and gross disproportionality stand at the centre
of the Court’s approach. Thus, Professor Cameron argues with some force
in her paper that the constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law
remains stymied and that substantive review under section 7 ought to be
abandoned.
In addition to concerns about the substantive interpretation of the
Charter, the public and persons involved in the administration of criminal
justice worry about the impact of the Charter on management of criminal
trials. There is a perception that resolution of cases on the merits has
been sacrificed in favour of endless motions dealing with trivial matters.
The constitutionalization of disclosure obligations on the Crown sometimes
seems to have led to nothing more than endless pre-trial skirmishing to
little if any benefit.
6

Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
7
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.).
8
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.).
9
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
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But, as Professor Roach observes in his paper, it is important to have
a sense of perspective, and while he is right in detecting a more sombre
mood in the 25th anniversary conferences than greeted the 20th anniversary
conferences, there is much to celebrate after 25 years, from enhanced
protections against wrongful convictions and intrusions into privacy, to
access to justice. In this introduction to this important work, I would like
to measure some of the impacts of the Charter on the criminal law.
There is no better place to begin than with Crown disclosure. The
disclosure obligations imposed by the Court in Stinchcombe10 have
sometimes proved to be an onerous burden not just for the prosecution
but for the courts as they attempt to mediate the claims, and for legal
aid, which must fund the defence. But in considering the value of a case
such as Stinchcombe one cannot lose sight of the pre-Charter state of the
law. Before the Charter, disclosure was at the whim of Crown counsel and
disclosure law was shaped by a presumption of guilt; accused could not
and should not be given disclosure because they would use the disclosure
to fabricate evidence and suborn perjury. If defence counsel were fortunate
enough to get some form of disclosure, it almost invariably came with
conditions such as an undertaking that disclosed witness statements not
be used to cross-examine the witnesses who provided them.
The toleration of that regime by counsel, lawmakers and the courts
illustrates the poverty of the pre-Charter legal culture and the profound
impact of the Charter. It may be that with time the disclosure rules would
have changed, but the Charter accelerated that process, and greatly
expanded the concept of the scope of what constitutes a minimum
acceptable standard. Equally as important as the change in the substance
and mechanics of disclosure catalyzed by Stinchcombe was the realignment
of attitudes about state investigation of crime. The Charter led to a shift
in paradigms. The view that the results of police investigations were the
property of the prosecution to be dispensed through the largesse of the
Crown was replaced with the perspective that the fruits of investigations
were, in the words of Sopinka J. in Stinchcombe, “the property of the public
to be used to ensure that justice is done”.11 In our adversarial system,
justice is done by enhancing so far as possible the right of the accused to
make full answer and defence. A constitutionally recognized right to full
disclosure is a fundamental condition precedent to the fulfillment of the
full answer and defence guarantee. A legally enforceable disclosure regime
10
11

R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 333 (S.C.C.).
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has helped detect past wrongful convictions and should continue to reduce
their number in the future.
Accepting the not undeserved criticism of Professor Stuart and others
about the state of the law of search and seizure, there is nevertheless
reason to take the long view. The gross abuses of privacy interests through
tools such as writs of assistance are a thing of the past. The mere existence
of an exclusionary power to enforce the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure has changed police behaviour. And, while the search
and seizure guarantee is seen in operation usually only in the sordid
world of guns, drugs and gangs, that criminal defendants have an interest
in litigating those issues has led to broader protections for all persons in
this country.
Moreover, as Professor Stewart and other contributors to this volume
point out, while dramatic changes to the law may no longer be expected,
the norms that underlie the Charter can be a source for incremental change
and even reversal of what some might see as undesirable developments.
Admittedly, all is not well. The legal recognition of a common law stop
and search power in Mann12 operating outside the right to counsel, arbitrary
detention and search and seizure protections is proving problematic.
Since there are few bright lines to guide police in the exercise of the stop
and search power, the judicial evaluation of the exercise of the power
sometimes seems capricious and result-driven. More troubling still is that
because much of the routine state-citizen encounters fall outside Charter
scrutiny there is a perception that aberrant state conduct is tolerated if
not encouraged. It has been argued that the courts have not been able to
come up with an effective and principled approach to systemic racism.
As Professor Tanovich points out, Charter litigation remains an important
means of addressing fundamental racial injustice. But the opportunity to
address these issues will be muted if the courts are unable to take a
critical race perspective. And, if the Charter continues to be interpreted
to have limited application to the most common interactions between
persons of colour and the police — the vehicle stops and pedestrian stops
— we risk an increasing sense of injustice amongst many members of
society. Administering the criminal justice system so that young men who
are stopped on the streets in poorer neighbourhoods must rely only on their
own wits and resources can only lead to increasing cynicism, alienation
and a perception that the enforcement of the criminal justice system
depends upon ignorance of rights and inequality of opportunity.
12

R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
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The Charter’s impact on access to justice is one of the most difficult
areas to assess. The Supreme Court’s refusal to adopt a hierarchy of
rights approach that would have the accused’s fair trial rights trump the
rights of victims and witnesses to equality and security offers the promise
of increased and more meaningful participation by victims and witnesses
in the criminal justice system. However, as Ms Barrett points out in her
paper, there are lingering concerns and very practical barriers to full
participation by victims and others who find themselves caught up in the
criminal justice system.
Other aspects of access to justice require some comment. In the
increasingly complex world of criminal litigation, the right to counsel is
crucial. The guarantees in section 10(b) to information about counsel
and the right to consult counsel were long overdue and offer enhanced
protection at the arrest stage. Yet as Justice Trotter and Professor Sherrin
point out, the Charter has had only a limited impact in the interrogation
room. While Justice Trotter argues persuasively that sensible reforms to
the confession rules need not depend upon the Charter, more problematic
is the inability of the courts and Parliament to translate the right to counsel
at the arrest stage into a robust right to counsel at the trial stage. Legal aid
entitlement is set so low that our courts are increasingly confronted with
unrepresented (euphemistically referred to as self-represented) accused.
While section 10(b) has been interpreted as guaranteeing a right to counsel
of one’s choice and the right to be represented by that counsel throughout
the proceedings, this has generally been understood as preventing the
state from doing anything to interfere with the right to counsel. The section
10(b) right has not been translated into a right to state-funded counsel at
all stages of the proceedings. Only in unusual circumstances is an accused
who has been refused legal aid for trial entitled to a remedy such as a
Rowbotham13 order for a stay of proceedings until state funding for
counsel is provided. Legal aid funding issues are, of course, complex and
with limited resources, the legal aid authorities are forced to make difficult
choices. It is to be hoped that Charter values at least will continue to
fuel the debate about access to justice and lead to a more vigorous right
to entitlement to competent counsel.
Access to justice is also about timely resolution of disputes. The
Charter is both the source of delay and its remedy. The increasing
complexity of criminal litigation caused by the Charter has burdened the
courts and led to worrisome trial delays even for accused detained pending
13

See R. v. Rowbotham, [1988] O.J. No. 271, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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trial. In the Askov case,14 the Supreme Court signalled that it was prepared
to take trial delay seriously by suggesting guidelines for institutional delay
and sanctioning the use of a stay of proceedings as the only remedy for
unacceptable delay. The hope of the Askov decision, however, was not
that courts would be able to resolve cases within the suggested guidelines,
but that the guidelines would serve as the outer limits. Some even
imagined shortening of the Askov guidelines as governments recognized
the need to contribute more resources to the criminal justice system.
But, the constitutional maximum seems, in busy jurisdictions, to have
become the operating minimum. There is thus the perception that the
state has not been forced to deal in a serious way with the appalling
consequences of delay: the emotional and financial toll on the innocent
while they await vindication; the attenuation of the impact of punishment
of the guilty when the sanction is imposed months or years after the
offence; the impact on victims who are in limbo for lengthy periods of
time; the impact on the reliability of the verdict when witnesses are required
to reconstruct events years later; and most disturbing, the lengthy periods of
time spent in pre-trial custody, which have resulted in an increasing
number of persons serving their sentences before conviction — either in
jail or on house arrest — rather than after conviction. This is an obvious
distortion of our punishment system. Increasing use of plea bargaining
to keep trial lists in check is also an unhappy consequence of the need
for the state to come up with a cost-neutral remedy for delay.
However, delay is not a new problem, and the value of the section
11(b) guarantee is that the criminal justice system has been forced to
confront it. It is to be hoped that in the future, more resources can be
found to enhance the system and that the courts can come up with an
expanded portfolio of remedies in addition to the extreme remedy of
a stay of proceedings. It may be that a more nuanced approach, with a
broader range of remedies, might be more satisfactory for society and
also more effective.
I conclude this introduction with a few comments on sentencing.
The Charter has contributed little towards a more rational, fair and humane
system of punishment. Thus, the courts have generally not interfered
with Parliament’s fascination with minimum jail terms as a solution to

14

R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.).
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crime.15 But at least in one aspect of sentencing the Charter has proved
to be of great and lasting significance. Less than 10 years after a misstep
in 199216 the Supreme Court returned to the vexing problem of capital
punishment in the extradition context. In Burns and Rafay17 the Court
held that the Charter would not permit the government to extradite without
obtaining assurances from the extradition partner, in this case the United
States, that the death penalty would not be imposed. Although this decision
was made in the extradition context, the reasoning would apply equally
in the domestic context. As a result, it seems unlikely that the courts would
uphold capital punishment should Parliament attempt its reintroduction.
But, just as importantly, there is no longer any real appetite in the
public for the return of capital punishment. There are many explanations,
the most obvious being the well-publicized wrongful convictions of persons
who might have been executed had the death penalty been available. But,
this attitudinal change can also be attributed to the Charter. The values
inherent in the legal rights protected by the Charter are not solely the
preserve of the legal culture but have been accepted by the public. The
Charter has not simply changed the way that crimes are investigated,
prosecuted and defended but has changed the way we all value due process.
That is not a bad legacy of 25 years of Charter experience.

15

Most recently in R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) again
upholding the four-year minimum for manslaughter where a firearm is used and all but shutting the
door to constitutional exemptions from minimum punishments.
16
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.);
Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.).
17
United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.).

